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PART I 
I NTRODUCTION 
I n December 1977 the New Zealand Committee on Defamation 
published its report entitled "Recommendations on the 
Law of Defamation". Those recommendations have never 
b een adopted, a fate they share with their English and 
l 
Australian counterparts However in June 1985 the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Mr Geoffrey 
Palmer said that a bill designed to simplify the law 
on defamation will be introduced to Parliament later 
this year, and that it would be based on the Committee's 
report of 1977
2 . 
One of the main recommendations in the report was 
that there should be a new statutory defence for the 
media. It was probably the most controversial proposal, 
and it took up a good part of the Committee's time and 
energy, but it was one which the Committee believed
3 , 
"will greatly reduce the inhibitory effect of 
the existing law of defamation without unjustly 
placing the plaintiff in an inferior position." 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the proposed 
media defence in the context of its viability and 
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desirability for present day purposes. Th
e discussion 
therefore will be of developments in this 
area over 
the past eight years, and the question of 
the need 
for change will only be considered in this
 light. 
The emphasis is on what the media defence 
should be. 
The submission I make in this paper is tha
t there is 
still a need for a media defence, but that
 it should 
not take precisely the same form as the Co
mmittee's 
proposal. Rather than having a defence of 
qualified 
privilege which is defeated by malice, my 
submission 
is that the media should have a defence to
 general 
damages, which is not defeated by malice. 
The 
requirements the media would have to prove
 to meet 
both of these defences are however, essen
tially the 
same. The defences are available where th
e media 
defendant had a reasonable belief that the
 matter 
they published was true. This submission a
dopts in 
part, proposals made but finally rejected 
by the 
Australian Law Reform Commis·sion
4 . 
My second submission is that the media sho
uld have 
another defence. This is the defence of f
air report 
for an attributed statement - a statement 
actually 
made by a person named in the publication.
 This 
defence was recommended by the Australian 
Commission 
5 
in its Final Report . 
THE COMMITTEE 
The Committee was appointed on 30 J
uly 1975 by the 
then Minister of Justice, Dr Martyn
 Finlay, with wide 
terms of reference, namely to study
 and make 
recommendations on the law of defam
ation. The 
appointment followed a review of de
famation commenced 
two years earlier by the Torts and 
General Law Reform 
Committee. The call for revision w
as prompted by a 
number of factors
6 . In the wake of the Watergate 
scandal it was claimed by some that
 it could never 
have been revealed or reported unde
r New Zealand 
law. A new Labour Government had j
ust been elected 
in New Zealand, and its Australian 
counterpart, also 
newly elected, had proposed revisio
n of its law on 
defamation. Furthermore, a series o
f judgments with 
heavy damages awarded had recently 
gone against 
the media, (for example News Media 
Ownership v Finlay
7 , 
E d 
. . 8) 
yre v New Zealan Press Association
 . There was 
also general criticism that the law
 was too complicated 
and too restrictive. 
The Committee called for and receiv
ed a wide range of 
submissions, and undertook its own 
statistical research 
in the form of a questionnaire sent
 to media publishers. 
It also used a research report based
 on a study of 
court records in Auckland, Wellingto
n and Christchurch
9 . 
The response to the questionnaire is p
resented in the 
Committee's report. The final report w
as preceded by 
a working paper. 
THE MEDIA DEFENCE 
The Committee decided that the balance
 between 
reputation and freedom of speech requir
ed some 
adjustment in favour of free speech an
d a free press, 
while at the same time however, affirm
ing the principle 
that reputation deserves reasonable pr
otection. 
It rejected suggestions that a rule suc
h as the 
"public official" rule in the United S
tates should be 
adopted, namely that a public official
 or a public 
figure should not succeed in an action 
for defamation 
relating to his or her conduct unless t
he defendant 
made the statement knowing that it was 
false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether it wa
s true or false. 
Such a rule would indeed be a radical d
eparture from 
present law. 
The Committee also rejected a widening 
of the defence 
of justification in relation to genera
l damages as 
had been suggested by an Australian Law
 Reform 
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. . d. . 10 Comm1ss1on 1scuss1on paper In the writer's 
view this proposal with some changes should be 
adopted. It will be discussed later in this paper. 
Instead, the Committee proposed a new statutory 
defence for the media which essentially gives the 
media qualified privilege where the publisher has 
acted with reasonable care and has given the person 
defamed an opportunity to publish a statement explaining
 
and/or rebutting the offending statement
11 . 
The defence contains four requirements, which I will 
set out in full: 
Matter published in a news medium shall be 
protected by qualified privilege if -
(a) the subject-matter of the publication was 
one of public interest at the time of 
publication; and 
(b) so far as the matter consists of statements 
of fact, the person by whom it was published 
at the time of publication acted with 
reasonable care in all the circumstances 
and believed on reasonable grounds that the 
statements of fact were true; and 
- 6 -
(c) so far as the matter consists of an expression 
of opinion -
(i) the opinion was at the time of publication 
the genuine opinion of the publisher; 
and 
(ii) the opinion was at the time of 
publication capable of being supported 
by any statements of fact to which 
paragraph (b) of this subsection 
applies, either by themselves or in 
conjunction with any other facts known 
at the time of the publication to the 
person to whom the publication was 
made; and 
(d) the publisher has given the person who 
claims to have been defamed by the publication 
an opportunity to have a reasonable statement 
of explanation or of rebuttal, or of both 
explanation and rebuttal, published in the 
same medium as the publication complained 
of, with adequate prominence and without 
undue delay. 
The defence can be defeated by failure to
 reply to a 
written complaint within 30 days specifyi
ng 
(a) the grounds on which the defendant b
elieved the 
facts to be true; and 
(b) the steps taken to verify the accura
cy of those 
statements of fact; and 
(c) failure to offer to pay incurred exp
enses to the 
plaintiff. 
The defendant has to prove these last thr
ee elements, 
and the defence is a matter for the judge
 alone to 
decide. 
The Committee defined a "news medium" as 
meaning a 
medium for the dissemination of public ne
ws, or 
observations on public news, or advertisem
ents to the 
public. 
The Committee chose the wording of the "p
ublic 
interest" requirement specifically for it
s generality. 
Matters of public interest are numerous a
nd "should 
not be confined within narrow limits
1112 • An 
alternative formulation that the subject-
matter of 
the publication be one of public concern 
and its 
publication be for the public benefit was
 rejected. 
The requirements concerning statements of 
fact were 
accepted as excluding live radio talk-back
 broadcasts 
from the ambit of the defence
13 . 
The standard of care is that of "an ordina
ry reasonable 
journalist in the particular circumstances
1114 • The 
degree of care required therefore, would v
ary &ccording 
to the type of reporting involved. 
The requirement of a statement in writing 
from the 
defendant was added to enable a plaintiff 
to determine 
how strong the publisher's position is un
der the 
defence. While it was accepted that jour
nalists 
reluctance to disclose sources may exclude
 the defence 
in some cases, the problem was not recogn
ised as 
. . lf . 15 presenting itse in most cases , 
As to comment, the defence does not apply 
to publications 
only containing comment, and what comment 
there is 
must be such that a reasonable person cou
ld honestly 
hold such an opinion on those facts. The 
comment can 
be supported partly by facts known to the 
person to 
h bl . 
. d 16 
w om pu ication was ma e , 
The Committee also proposed a statutory provision t
o 
help determine what is a reasonable statement of 
explanation or rebuttal, in the following form:
17 
"It shall be evidence of the reasonableness of 
the statement proposed by either party, that that 
party offered to have any issue as to the content 
or presentation thereof determined by an independen
t 
third person." 
The refusal of such an offer shall be evidence of t
he 
unreasonableness of the refusing party's statement.
 
This provision was to ensure the question of 
unreasonableness was not decided solely by the 
publisher, and to avoid the delays which accompany 
resort to the courts. 
Finally, the defence fails if
18 , 
"the plaintiff alleges and proves that ... the 
defendant was actuated by spite or ill will 
towards the plaintiff or otherwise took improper 
advantage of the occasion of publication." 
Given this proposed defence, and the special positi
on 
in which it places the media, it is useful to descr
ibe 
briefly the broader issues involved in the law of 
defamation. 
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THE WIDER CONTEXT 
It is well known that the law of defamation serves to 
strike a balance between two competing rights, the 
right to freedom of speech and the right to have the 
individual's interest in his or her reputation protected. 
The development of the law of defamation it has been 
sa id, is a "tale of two interests
1119 • 
In both Australia and New Zealand there has been a 
vi ew that the present law favours the protection of 
individual reputation too readily at the expense of 
fr eedom of speech. The strongest voice from outside 
the legal profession in support of this view not 
surprisingly comes from the media. It is said that 
both the presentation of facts of public interest and 
comment on those facts is unduly restricted. A more 
ex treme view can be seen in the words of Douglas J of 
t he United States Supreme Court in Gertz v Robert 
Welsh Inc 20 when he said in relation to the First 
Am endment (protecting freedom of speech and of the 
press), "the First Amendment would ban Congress from 
passing any libel law". 
Such a view, although representing a minority of 
J ustices of the United States Supreme Court is 
i nteresting to note, particularly since the publi c ation 
of a Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights, which in its
 
present form guarantees the
21 
"right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and opinions of any kind in any form" 
subject only to such "reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free a
nd 
democratic society." 
It should not be forgotten that there is a third pa
rty 
with an interest in defamation law, the public. 
Freedom of speech is a right held dearly by free an
d 
democratic countries, and it is seen as essential f
or 
true and effective democratic government. Thus 
"society is entitled to a free flow of information 
. . . .,22 
and to give and take robust and stimulating commen
t . 
The Committee's media defence therefore, involves a
n 
adjustment of this balance in favour of freedom of 
speech, while at the same time trying to preserve 
reasonable protection to the individual's reputatio
n. 
A NEED FOR CHANGE? 
The discussion prompted by the report is more easil
y 
dealt with if it is divided into two areas. Firstl
y 
there is the initial question as to the need for 
change, and secondly the question as to how well th
e 
Committee's proposed defence meets its task. 
- 12 -
on the threshold question of the need for change, the 
discussions since 1977 suggest that a conclusion 
sat isfactory to everyone will prove elusive. The 
ne ed for reform is not obvious. On reviewing the 
arg uments however, it is the writer's view that a 
de fence which provides greater protection for the 
med ia is justified and desirable. My submission is 
t ha t the need has been sufficiently made out for the 
best approach to be to concentrate on the merits of 
t h e particular defences possible. 
Th e criticisms wielded by the media at the present 
st ate of defamation law are viewed by some as 
compelling reasons for searching for some means of 
ad justing the balance between reputation and free d om 
of speech more in favour of the media. The criticisms 
can be summarised as follows: 
1. cases are too long and costly, and are normally 
decided against the media. 
2. the outcome is too unpredictable, both as to 
liability and damages. 
3. the law is too complicated, so there are often 
grounds for appeal, 
4 . the burden of establishing truth is too great. 
5. the use of 'gagging writs' to intimidate the 
media from further publication
23 . 
- 13 -
24 
6 , the cost of damages , particularly for small
er 
publications. 
7 , printer's liability - a further hurdle for the
 
media. 
The result of these factors it is then claimed, is 
to 
produce a 'chilling effect' on the media. Due to 
fears of being sued for defamation, journalists and 
reporters are inhibited in what they will allow to 
go 
to print or be published, and so withhold informatio
n 
which they would otherwise publish as being of publ
ic 
interest. Investigative reporting in particular is 
seen as vulnerable since the more important the 
in formation the worse the dilemma. The result is a 
lack of frank and fearless reporting. 
Gi ven the reasons put forward for change and these 
cr iticisms, it is the writer's view that the follow
ing 
statement made by Lord Goodman, Chairman of the 
Newspaper Publishers Association in England is a 
l ·ttl 'd 1· · 
25 
1 e 1 ea 1st1c, 
"A great newspaper - if it believes that some 
villainy ought to be exposed - should expose •it 
without hesitation and without regard to the law 
of libel. If the ed itor, his reporters and his 
advisers are men of judgement and sense, they 
are unlikely to go wrong; but if they do go 
- 14 -
wrong the principle of publish and be damned is a 
valiant and a sensible one for the newspaper and 
it should bear the responsibility. Publish -
and let someone else be damned - is a discreditable 
principle for a free press." 
Obviously individual reputation still needs to be 
protected and the robust approach still has its 
pl ace, but it can be seen that even if the balance is 
l eft as it is, the reformulation of the present law 
in s uch a way as to speed up the dispute process and 
t o c larify and simplify the law would go some way to 
meeting some of the criticisms. 
The first call for change therefore, is directed at 
the complexity of the present law, and finds support 
f ' h' th ' d' ' 26 rom wit in e JU iciary, 
"To the comparative newcomer the law of libel 
seems to have characteristics of such complication 
and subtlety that I wonder whether a jury on 
retiring can readily distinguish their heads from 
their heels." 
(i) Commentators 
The more controversial issue is whether the law 
should be extended to afford the media greater 
protection. In the preface to the most recent 
- 15 -
edition of Gatley on Libel and Slander the
 
editor states that he continues to hold th
e view 
that the balance of the law between plain
tiff 
and defendant is about right
27 However he 
sees the recommendation of the Australian 
Commission of a qualified privilege for th
e fair 
report of another's statement on a topic o
f 
public interest as worthwhile. Edward Llo
yd QC 
(Victoria) commenting last year, thought i
t 
unlikely that the efforts of any of the de
famation 
f 
. f . 28 
re orm Committees would bear much ruit 
. The 
reason he suggests, is that whatever its 
imperfections the present law works at lea
st as 
well as any feasible alternative. He saw 
the 
complaint that investigative journalism is
 
inhibited by present libel law as being la
rgely 
a myth. 
Mr Justice Kirby however, in a paper prese
nted 
at the 1978 NZ Law Society Conference whi
le he 
was chairman of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, saw both Australia and New Ze
aland 
in mutual agreement that the current law i
s 
. f 29 unsatis actory What is needed he sa
id, is 
a new balance which is somewhat more favo
urable 
to free speech and a free press. 
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A more comprehensive discussion of the proposed 
media defence for New Zealand by CR French 
concluded that "the proposed special media 
privilege is open to objection on the grounds 
that it is undesirable, unnecessary and 
unworkable
1130 • A central issue is whether the 
law does in fact restrict the media. The Faulks 
Committee on Defamation in England thought there 
was a lack of concrete evidence behind the claim 
and use the statement I quoted earlier from Lord 
G d t h 
. . 31 
oo man o support t eir view French points 
out that the NZ Committee's survey showed that 
the majority of those members of the news media 
who responded to their questionnaire regarded 
the law as only moderately restrictive and were 
opposed to giving the media special protection
32 
However the only answer available in a higher 
category was "very restrictive", Surely the law 
does not need to be "very restrictive" before 
the need for reform can be accepted? Furthermore, 
these terms are only of limited use since they 
mean different things to different people, 
There is also the question of who particular 
respondents were - the views of national television 
being more irrrrtant than those of a local radio 
station. The survey showed considerable support 
for the proposal that people in public office 
should be restricted in suing, and tha
t it was 
common for newspapers to have excluded
 material 
which the publishers thought would hav
e been in 
the public interest. 
(ii) The Writer's View 
It is the writer's view that on the bala
nce of 
the evidence and the arguments the nee
d for 
change is strong enough to warrant refo
rm. The 
issue should not be clouded by an "all
 or nothing" 
approach. A claim that modest pieces 
of 
investigative journalism are unduly re
stricted 
is a more useful and accurate claim th
an one 
that New Zealand could never have a W
atergate. 
Similarly, do we need evidence that "t
he news 
media are in danger of being crippled 
by the 
costs attributable to the law of defam
ation 1133
 
before we can appreciate the plight of
 the small 
newspaper? 
In August 1983 The Listener recorded th
at
34 
"journalists, broadcasters, publishers
 and 
printers frankly admit to being intimi
dated 
by threats of defamation actions. Wo
rse, 
some admit to printing apolgies for ar
ticles 
they know to be correct." 
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I submit that even quite apart from the empirical 
evidence this claim makes reasonable sense. 
What small-time publisher will risk his or her 
business on a single story, no matter how well 
researched, and what journalist can guarantee to 
his superiors that not only is his story true, 
but that he could prove it to be true? 
Of course there are other sides to the debate. 
The previous Attorney-General, Mr McClay, claimed 
that any lack of hard-hitting investigative 
reporting should be blamed on the "excessive 
timidity" of media bosses
35 . He saw the 
Committee's Report as essentially weighted in 
favour of the news media - a reference to the 
media connections of five of its seven members. 
The number of cases going to court he said is 
not only very small, but heavily weighted in 
favour of the plaintiff in terms of the merits 
of the claims. He attributed this to the robust 
attitudes of the defendants involved and does 
not mention the possible impact of the gagging 
writ problem or the extent of self-censorship. 
It could well be time however, to say that "the 
media are sometimes disposed to take a rather 
philosophical view as to the extent to which 
1 h ld . h 1 . 1 ·f. t' 
36 
peop e sou resign t emse ves to vii ica ion . 
- 19 -
One interesting development since the Committee's 
Report is the effect of the Official Information 
Act 1982. It can be argued that since under the 
operation of the Act a far greater range of 
information is available to the public, the 
media can now ensure far more easily that what 
they publish is true and prove it to be true. 
Not only can more accurate research be conducted 
but particular allegations can be backed up with 
concrete evidence. I submit that this development 
does not significantly lessen the need for a 
media defence. It may well make the defence of 
justification more useful, which is highly 
desirable, but the use of the information available 
will have its limits. Defamatory allegations 
can be based on a far wider range of material 
than official information. For example they may 
concern the activities of a private company. 
What information is obtainable under the Act may 
well be better suited to proving reasonable care 
under the media defence than proving the truth 
of particular defamatory remarks. Obtaining 
information under the Act may also take too 
long, especially since such information will 
rarely initiate the investigation of a particular 
story. Furthermore, it may be that the Act will 
result in a greater number of potentially defamatory 
- 20 -
articles being published in situations where 
publication is desirable, without in turn 
providing the media with sufficient protection 
for such publication. 
In conclusion, I can see no substantial reasons 
why a media defence is no longer needed. The 
answer to this issue will it appears, depend to 
an extent on the individual's personal preference, 
but it is the writer's view that there is a need 
for change. I add finally that a defence such 
as that proposed by the Committee does not 
afford the media as much protection as they are 
given in the United States under the 'public 
official rule 1
37 , and while such a rule may 
not be suited to New Zealand, its use in America 
adds weight to the view that our own law could be 
successfully freed up. 
REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS 
( i) The Problem 
Before considering briefly the reaction to the 
Committee's proposed defence, it is useful to 
isolate the specific problem which it set out to 
solve. 
- 21 -
The problem arises where a newsp
aper, or radio or 
television station publishes fac
ts which it 
genuinely believes to be true, b
ut which turn 
out to be false, or which it can
not prove to be 
true. In defence of any subseque
nt action for 
defamation the media clearly can
not rely on the 
defences of truth, fair comment 
or unintentional 
defamation (which relates to wor
ds published 
without the publisher intending 
or knowing them 
to be defamatory of the plaintif
f). Nor can the 
media defendant rely on common la
w qualified 
privilege, since the media will 
rarely reach only 
those with a duty or interest in 
receiving the 
statements published. The media 
will often 
reach people who,,, the courts regar
d as falling 
outside the scope of the privileg
e. Although it 
has been argued that the media h
as a duty to 
provide information on matters o
f public interest 
and to publish such information t
o the public, 
the courts have refused to recog
nise such a wide 
application of the privilege. T
hus the Court of 
Appeal held in Truth (NZ) Ltd v H
olloway
38 that 
"there is no principle of law, an
d certainly 
no case that we know of, which m
ay be 
invoked in support of the conten
tion that a 
newspaper can claim privilege if 
it publishes 
a defamatory statement of fact ab
out an 
individual merely because the ge
neral topic 
- 22 -
developed in the article is a matter of 
public interest." 
The media defendant must show therefore, that
 
publication was on an occasion of statutory 
qualified privilege under Section 17 of the 
Defamation Act 1954. This section only affor
ds 
protection to the "fair and accurate report" 
of 
various meetings and proceedings, and so it w
ill 
rarely be of assistance where the media initi
ate 
the allegation or their facts come from other
 
sources. 
The result is that in the situation described
 
the media have no defence. In the absence of
 a 
defence of reasonable care, the general resul
t 
it is claimed, is what is known as the chillin
g 
effect. Rather than risk a damages suit a 
publisher who genuinely believes his facts to
 be 
true will withhold the information. 
The existing law therefore can be attacked in
 
two ways. Firstly, in that it results in an 
exercise of overcaution by the media, and 
secondly, that even if the media calculated t
he 
extent of the law to perfection, it still und
uly 
restricts what the media can and cannot publi
sh 
- 23 -
with impunity. The first point concerns the 
desire to make it clear what the law is, to make 
it precise and relatively simple, to speed up 
the processes involved and to possibly change 
the remedies available. The second point relates 
more to the actual content of the defences - the 
defences available do not go far enough. 
A further problem which can be identified is the 
liability of the media for the publication of a 
statement which is clearly the view of another, 
made for the purposes of republication. This 
problem will sometimes overlap with the first. 
(i i) The Reaction 
Apart from the fact that the Committee's proposals 
have not been adopted, what has been the reaction 
to the proposed media defence? 
To begin with there are the rather guarded 
remarks of Professor JF Burrows
39 . He identifies 
two interesting features about the proposed 
privilege. Firstly, it demonstrates the tendency 
toward substituting a right of reply for dQmages, 
and secondly it elevates the media above the 
ordinary citizen and provides them with a special 
- 24 -
privilege. The privilege he said, would have 
the potential to relax the law considerably, but 
in his opinion everything would depend on the 
interpretation the courts were prepared to place 
on the requirement of reasonable care. Even 
without the privilege he saw a slight shift in 
the court's attitude towards a position more 
favourable to the press than it was. 
I note that the Committee justified the special 
position the defence grants to the media by 
saying that a defence which covered the media 
was necessary, and that the requirements suitable 
for such a defence required it to be restricted 
h d
. 40 
tote news me ia . It seems reasonable in 
the writer's view, that since the media by the 
very service they provide are especially vulnerable 
to the law of defamation, that they should be 
'allowed' a special privilege if it is the most 
suitable form of protection. 
Well known defamation lawyer Tom Goddard appeared 
to see little merit at all in the proposed 
defence41 . Apart from his general scepticism 
of the "chilling effect" he saw the defence as 
failing in its task. In his view statements of 
explanation or rebuttal are almost invariably 
- 25 -
unacceptable to the publisher in their submitted 
form. Furthermore, to use the defence a publisher 
would have to disclose his sources of information, 
which is traditionally unacceptable to newspapers 
d . 1 · 42 an Journa 1sts . Another fault he saw, was 
that if the defence is raised in a jury trial, 
it shall be for the judge alone to determine 
whether the defence is established. The answer 
he says, "lies not in law reform, but in the 
education and training of responsible 
. 1 · .,43 Journa 1sts . 
CR French saw the proposal as open to objection 
on the grounds that it is "undesirable, unnecessary 
44 
and unworkable" . He saw the right of reply 
provision as an inadequate safeguard of little 
benefit to a defamed person and wrought with 
practical difficulties. Indeed in his view the 
right of reply could be used to make the issue an 
ongoing one. He saw the omission of any provision 
for special damages - such as to enable a plaintiff 
to recover for the loss of his job - as 
unsatisfactory. Finally French mentions the 
criticisms that good investigative journalism 
cannot be created by statutory amendment and 
that the new defence may well add to the 
complexities of the law rather than relieve 
them. 
- 26 -
Perhaps the most recent discussion of the NZ 
Committee's report is that of the Publi c Issue
s 
Committee of the Auckland District Law Society
. 
In a report published in December 1983 entitle
d 
w 
~ ublic Figures and the Law of Defamation, the
 
committee decided that the statutory defence f
or 
the media proposed by the NZ Committee deserve
d 
serious reconsideration. In the Auckland Com
mittee's 
view the proposed defence was "hardly a defam
er's 
charter 1145 , and the criticisms by French and 
others were not compelling. They also echoed
 
the view of the NZ Committee in rejecting the 
suggestion that the American "public figure 
rule" be adopted in New Zealand. The adoption
 
of the media defence was thus endorsed as a m
easure 
of long overdue law reform. 
The proposed defence therefore, has received a
 
mixed reaction. It is said at worst to have 
failed in an unnecessary task. It is intere
sting 
however, that the criticisms do not point to a
ny 
serious infringements by the defence to the ri
ght 
of the individual to have his or her reputatio
n 
protected, It is my submission in this pape
r 
that the adoption of a similar defence would b
e 
a desirable reform. 
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I turn now to consider how the common law 
has 
developed since 1977, and the impact of th
ose 
developments on the media defence debate. 
COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
There have been no significant changes to 
the media's 
position since the Committee's Report in 1
977. It 
would appear that the law of defamation in
 this area 
has reached a stalemate. For any change t
he media must 
l ook to Parliament and the imminent introd
uction of the 
Defamation Bi1'1. 
The position adopted by the courts would a
ppear to be 
t hat demonstrated by the Court of Appeal d
ecision in 
J ones v Templeton
46 The plaintiff, a candidate in 
t he 1984 general election brought an actio
n for 
defamation against . the sitting member in t
he seat he 
was to contest. The defendant had distrib
uted to the 
parliamentary press gallery copies of a sp
eech he had 
made to the annual general meeting of his 
electoral 
branch of his political party. The partic
ular 
allegation in the speech sued on was that 
the plaintiff 
"despised Jews". Extracts from the speech
, including 
that allegation had been republished on na
tional 
television news. 
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The relevant part of the judgment, which is an 
appeal from interlocutory proceedings, is the discussion 
by Cooke Jin allowing the plaintiff's cross-appeal 
a nd striking out the defence of qualified privilege. 
47 
The defence was pleaded 
"by reason of the social and/or moral duty of 
the Defendant to make a statement to the general 
public as to the conduct and the fitness for 
public office of a declared candidate ... and by 
reason of the corresponding interest of the 
general public to receive it." 
I n considering the scope of qualified privilege, 
Cooke J discussed the Committee's recommendation that 
t here should be a general statutory defence for the 
news media, but noted in particular that the 
r ecommendations in the report have not been adopted by 
t he legislature "for whatever reason
1148 • Thus "if any 
development of the law of qualified privilege is to 
49 
b e made in this country, it falls to the Courts" . 
The ensuing discussion points out that to extend the 
scope of the privilege is not altogether without 
a ttraction, but it has to be remembered that there 
a re also strorig arguments against doing so. The 
views of the various law reform reports were relevant 
when considering whether the Courts should develop 
t he law in a certain direction but then so was the 
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r eaction of the legislature to those 
views. Here the 
legislature has not acted on the medi
a privilege 
r ecommendation so the Courts should b
e "especially 
cautious before moving towards a qual
ified privilege 
which in some ways would be even wide
r 1150 • Anything 
akin to the American doctrine establis
hed by New York 
Times v Sullivan
51 ought not to be introduced into 
1 d 1 b . d' ' 1 d
 ' ' 52 
New Zea an aw y JU 1c1a ec1s1on; 
"If there is to be any major change in
 this 
field, it should be made by Parliamen
t. The 
whole subject may well warrant the at
tention of 
Parliament. If the subject is brough
t before 
Parliament, the account that we have 
given of 
the competing considerations may perh
aps be of 
some help." 
I t would seem therefore, that if the 
law is to develop 
i n this area, the responsibility lies
 with Parliament. 
Until there is some indication from th
e legislature as 
t o how far the privilege should exten
d, the position 
is likely to remain static. 
In Jones v Templeton the Court was cle
ar that "the 
mere fact that the plaintiff was a de
clared 
parliamentary candidate cannot be tre
ated as imposing 
on the defendant a social or moral du
ty to make a 
defamatory statement about him to the
 general 
public
1153 
In addition they were prepared to 
54 
assume, 
"that in this age of universal suffrage there may 
be occasions when the only reasonably practical 
mode of effectively communicating with electors 
in a given constituency will be by speech at a 
public meeting there or by circular. The 
inevitability of the audience or the readers 
including persons not electors in that 
constituency would not, on this view, destroy 
the privilege." 
Clearly however, publication was too wide here. 
1 
55 · h 1 · ' f h . . 1 As Gat ey points out t e imits o t e princip e
 
that qualified privilege may apply to communicatio
ns 
to an electorate is far from clear. The earlier C
ourt 
of Appeal decision in R Lucas and Son (Nelson Mail
) Ltd 
v O'Brien
56 gives some support to the view that a 
newspaper may have a social or moral public duty t
o 
publish material concerning the fitness of candida
tes 
for public office. The Nelson Mail case was used 
in 
Mcsweeney v Berryman to suppport the statement by 
57 
Barker J that, 
"the authorities may well recognise that the 
publication of defamatory matter in a newspaper 
may be privileged where the matter published is 
of general interest and it is the duty of the 
publisher to communicate the information to the 
general public." 
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The cases provide a clear indicat
ion that the media may 
f all within the scope of common l
aw qualified privilege 
where the matter published relate
s to election issues. 
There is however no general rule,
 and the existence of 
t he privilege will depend on the 
circumstances of each 
case. If the defamatory statement
s are protected, it 
will be due to the news medium ha
ving a duty to publish 
t hem and the public having a corr
esponding interest in 
r eceiving them. It will not be o
n the basis that the 
media exercised reasonable care. 
58 
While Templeton v Jones leaves 
room for some 
development in the area of electo
ral communications, 
it has transferred the initiative
 for any broader or 
more significant developments int
o Parliament's hands. 
The media defences discussed in t
his paper involve 
r eform on this wider level, for t
he problems they seek 
t o resolve are not limited to ele
ction matters. The 
, 
writer's submissions will therefo
re require satutory 
reform. To determine what the m
edia defences should be, 
I turn to look at developments in
 other jurisdictions. 
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PART II 
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENTS 
Thus far, what the writer has tried to sh
ow is that 
there should be a media defence, but that
 such a 
defence is unlikely at least in the near 
future to 
c ome from the common law. I turn now to th
e question 
of what such a defence should be, 
In answering this question it is useful t
o draw on 
d evelopments overseas. The only alternat
ive solutions 
suggested by the experience of other coun
tries which 
I will draw on extensively, are the propo
sals put 
forward in Australia by the Australian La
w Reform 
Commission, It appears that the main dev
elopments in 
this area of defamation law since 1977 ar
e those 
which have taken place in Australia. I 
will briefly 
note the position in the United States. 
The submission I make in this paper, whic
h I will 
detail further on, is that the media shou
ld have two 
defences to a defamation action. One 
is essentially 
a defence of reasonable care which is not
 defeated by 
malice, the other removes liability for t
he publication 
of a statement clearly attributed to anot
her. 
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THE UNITED STATES 
Some consideration needs to be given first to the 
"public official" rule in the United States. The 
r ul e provides that a public official shall not succeed 
i n an action for defamation relating to his official 
conduct unless the defendant made the statement 
knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard 
as t o whether it was true or false (New York Times v 
1 . 59) Sul ivan . The rule provides an extremely wide 
constitutional privilege based on the First Amendment, 
which effectively excludes most public officials from 
succeeding as plaintiffs in defamation actions. 
Under the rule punitive damages may be awarded and 
there is no liability without fault
60 . Since the New 
Y k T . 61 d 
. . or imes ec1s1on in 1964 the rule has had a 
turbulent history, particularly over questions as to 
who is a public official and how private defamation 
t . 
62 
ac ions are affected . 
The NZ Committee received two submissions suggesting 
that the public official rule be adopted in New 
Zea land. For the majority however, the rule went too 
far in favour of the defendant at the plaintiff's 
63 expense . 
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It is interesting to note that the present Minister of 
Just ice, Mr Geoffrey Palmer has in the past advocated 
t he adoption of such a rule for New Zealand, stating 
t hat "it is just possible that the Americans might 
h . . ht"64 have got somet 1ng rig . He admits that his 
posi tion is a strong one and the change would be 
. . b 65 w1derang1ng, ut says, 
"We need uninhibited, robust and wide open 
debate on public issues in New Zealand. We are 
not getting it and we will not get it unless the 
libel laws are altered." 
It i s the writer's view that the rule not only goes 
too far but that it would be unacceptable to the New 
Zealand public. It leaves open too much room for 
speculative journalism by protecting the publication 
of f alse facts so long as the statement was made 
without knowledge that it was false or without reckless 
dis regard as to whether it was true or false. I 
submit that it is preferable to extend the media's 
protection by way of the reasonableness of their 
actions, rather than by excluding a category of pevple 
from having an action available as a general rule. 
.. 
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THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION 
In June 1976 the Australian Law Reform Commission was 
given two separate terms of Reference, dealing with 
privacy and defamation respectively. The defamation 
Reference required the Commission to review the law 
of defamation and to report on desirable changes, 
having particular regard to proposals for a uniform 
defamation law throughout Australia. 
The Commission set about its task using the considerable 
resources at its disposal, under the Chairmanship of 
Mr Justice Kirby. The discussion papers issued 
received wide publicity and seminars held throughout 
Aus tralia were an "outstanding success 1166 • The 
result the Commission said, was a "public debate 
whi ch, both in policy and detail, proceeded to an 
extent rarely achieved in Australian law making 1167 . 
As a prelude to the publication of the Commission's 
Final Report in 1979, a detailed background paper was 
prepared on the "Present Law and Possible Changes", 
Tha t paper was it said, "heavily influenced by the 
view that there is in Australia excessive media 
sel f-censorship 1168 • It provides a comprehensive 
dis cussion of defamation law and in many ways it was 
fou nd to be more useful for the purposes of this paper 
tha n the Final Report itself. 
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unf ortunately, the recommendations in the Final Report 
have not been adopted. In reading through the 
Australian Attorney-General's press releases since 
1979, it appears that there is now little hope of a 
un i form law in Australia being achieved. Hopes have 
been raised only to subsequently peter out in the 
fa ce of renewed difficulties
69 . The debate has not 
bee n without its casualties. As the Attorney-General 
Senator Gareth Evans said in October 1984, 
70 
"I doubt that anybody has been more defamed on 
the topic of defamation than I have." 
Given the similar fate of the NZ Committee's 
r ecommendations and the differences between the two 
countries' reform proposals, it is useful to note the 
comments of the Australian Commission in its Final 
Report, 71 
"Defamation and privacy are, at least, as 
politically and socially controversial as consumer 
credit. Moreover, they are in an area in which 
value judgements, personal opinions and even 
personal prejudice play a part. It would be 
possible to appoint any number of different 
committees, of competent people, and to receive 
an equal number of different sets of 
recommendations none of which was demonstrably 
wrong." 
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r tu rn now to consider two proposed defamation 
defences which were included in the Australian 
background paper. Both of these defenc es, with 
modi fications, should in the writer's view be adopted 
i n New Zealand. The first defence is a media defence 
to general damages where they had a reasonable belief 
t hat the matter published was true. The second is a 
defence of fair report for the publication (by 
anybody) of a statement attributed to another. 
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PART III 
THE REASONABLE BELIEF IN TRUTH DEFENCE 
The Australian Background Paper suggested a radical 
r emedy, which in contrast to the proposed media defence 
in New Zealand, included divesting the defence of 
qual ified privilege from the media and so "reversing 
a recent undesirable trend
1172 • The paper disliked 
the suggestion of making the qualified privilege 
defence available to the media because it "introduces 
the logical irrelevancy of malice
1173 If there is 
to b e a media defence of reasonable publication the 
pape r said it should firstly be independent of malice, 
and secondly the criteria justifying publication 
shou ld be clearly stated. 
The suggestion in the paper is that the existing sole 
remedy of damages be remitted to a secondary role, behind 
ret raction and the right of reply. However damages 
should remain recoverable "in the rare case where a 
plaintiff can prove an actual financial loss as a result 
of the defamation
1174 • The general exclusion of 
damages would be conditional upon the defendant 
establishing a belief in truth based upon reasonable 
enquiries. 
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The proposed defence was a general defence whi
ch 
ex tended the defence of justification to exclu
de 
liability for general damages where the defend
ant; 
(1) believed on reasonable grounds that the 
facts were true, 
(2) afforded the person defamed an opportuni
ty 
for reply, and 
(3) the matter published related to a subjec
t of 
public interest. 
75 
The following formulation was suggested, 
"Damages in defamation, other than damages for
 
any loss actually incurred by a plaintiff as a
 
result of the publication complained of, shall
 
not be recoverable in respect of the publicati
on 
of any matter if: 
(a) the defendant, on reasonable grounds and
 
after making all enquiries re~sonably open 
to him in the circumstances, in fact believed 
the truth of all statements of fact contained 
in, or assumed by, the matter published. 
(b) the defendant has afforded the person 
defamed by such matter, a full and adequate 
reply to any defamatory imputations contained 
therein. 
(c) the matter published relates to a subjec
t 
of public interest. 
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A reply is only full and adequate if: 
(i) the defendant, not having previously published 
a reply by the plaintiff, publishes or 
causes to be published, such reply at the 
earliest reasonable opportunity following 
request by the plaintiff to reply. 
(ii) the reply is published in such form and 
manner as to be likely to reach the same 
general audience as the matter complained 
of. 
In determining what is the earliest reasonable 
opportunity regard shall be had to the nature 
and manner of publication of the attributed 
statement and the damage likely to be suffered 
by the plaintiff by reason of any delay." 
The Australian Commission rejected this defence in 
its final report. It found strong opposition to the 
proposal. A proposal similar to this it noted, had 
been made by one English Committee and condemned by 
76 
another . The Commission rejected the defence on 
the principle that "as between the accuser and a 
pa ssive victim, the accuser should bear the loss, 
however reasonably he might have acted
1177 . Thus the 
Commission said, the defendant is wrong in fact, even 
. 78 
if he may be morally blameless; 
"a person whose reputation has been injured 
should not be denied compensation merely because 
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the person causing the injury genuinely believed 
that he did not deserve the reputation." 
It was thought that the circumstances surrounding 
the p ublication should only be taken into account in 
as sessing damages, as they are now. 
The Commission went further to recommmend that qualified 
privilege should be enacted in a statute, but in the 
form of a 'limited privilege' which is not defeated 
by malice and which is specifically unavailable to 
. 7 9 
t he news media . The reason for this was that to 
grant the media qualified privilege would be to deny 
t o persons publicly defamed all redress - not even a 
right of reply. It was thought that the defence of 
qual ified privilege would open the way for generalised 
smea rs, particularly against persons in public life. 
The media would not even have to disclose the source 
of t he information. Apart from these arguments of 
principle, the Commission also found that the evidence 
did not support the argument that qualified privilege 
would encourage exposures in the public interest. 
Give n the similarity between the media defence 
rejected by the Commission and that proposed by the NZ 
Committee, the Commission's view is a direct challenge 
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to the latter's proposal. It is a conclusion that 
there should be no defence available to the media 
merely because they acted reasonably. 
r t is the writer's view that the media should still 
have a defence of 'reasonable belief in truth'. The 
form of the defence which I propose later in this 
paper is a defence to general damages only, and the 
de fence is only available if the person defamed has 
had a n opportunity to have published a reasonable 
statement of explanation and/or rebuttal. Perhaps 
the r eal issue in question is how often will a media 
publi sher who has taken all reasonable care 'get it 
wr ong ', and publish matter which is actually untrue? 
No de finitive answer can be given, but the following 
two points can be made. Firstly the standard of care 
requi red by the defence would be one of a 'sliding 
80 
scale ' . The more serious the allegations the 
greater the obligation to verify the facts. For 
example where a man informs a press photographer that 
the woman posing beside him is his wife, as in Cassidy 
v Dai ly Mirror 81 , the obligation would be almo st 
non-e xistent. Secondly, it is questionable whether 
I 
the media's liability for defamation should be strict, 
for a s one writer has put it, strict liability
82 
"unfairly imposes. on the publisher of the 
defamatory statement a form of enterprise 
liability by making him pay the cost of 
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preserving the societal interest of public 
discussion." 
I t could be that the Commission's conclusion reflects 
the fact that it is far easier to envisage the wrongly 
defamed citizen than it is the increased benefit to 
society as a whole through robust and stimulating 
debate. 
I turn now to consider the differences between the 
defence proposed in the Australian background paper 
a nd that suggested by the New Zealand Committee. The 
f irst is that the Australian proposal was for a 
defence not defeated by malice. Secondly, the 
Australian proposal was narrower in scope in that it 
d id not cover expression of opinion, and thirdly the 
Australian defence was a change in the nature of the 
r emedy, in that it was a defence to general damages. 
THE MALICE QUESTION 
( i ) The Argument 
The concern expressed in the background paper 
was that in public debate on matters of public 
concern, truth should b e the touchstone. In 
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practice, the media tendency to rely on qualified 
privilege makes malice the critical issue in 
the case. This it was suggested, is because in 
many cases the published material is either 
untrue or cannot be proved to be true. The 
defendant therefore, is forced to 'look sideways' 
at the defence of qualified privilege and tries 
to escape liability by means of the circumstances 
of the publication. This then introduces the 
irrelevancy of malice - irrelevant because the 
interest which ought to be protected is the 
right of the public to receive the information. 
This should not be denied because of "some 
pre-existing animosity between a newspaper 
proprietor and a public figure to whom reference 
is proposed to be made
1183 • Under the present 
law, the same news item published in two 
different newspapers may invoke liability on one 
paper but not on the other, merely because 
the plaintiff cannot prove malice in the latter 
case. 
This argument suggests that the law, in its 
desire to protect the individual's reputation, 
looks at a factor which it shouldn't really 
take into consideration. It could also be 
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added, that in rejecting the "reasonable belief 
in truth" defence in its final report, the 
Australian Commission said that the elements of 
the defence should go towards mitigation of 
damages only84 . Similarly it can be argued 
here, that the motives of the publisher should 
go only towards the award of damages once the 
defendant publisher has been found liable. 
The Australian Commission rejected the legal 
concept of malice as having a role in the 
defences of privilege and fair comment also. 
However they recorrunended that to use the defence 
of comment the matter must be the "genuine 
opinion" of the author of the comment. Under 
the present law it should be remembered, two 
authors can both actually hold their opinions, 
but it is possible for one of them to be liable 
for defamation and not the other, becaus~ the 
plaintiff can only show that one author was 
actuated by malice. 
The malice argument raised is an interesting 
proposal. The change would cut out all the 
traditional problems associated with malice, and 
has the much sought after quality in defamation 
reform of simplifying the law. Can however, the 
argument be answered? 
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(ii) The Opposing View 
The NZ Committee was aware of the argument and 
rejected it. Their reasoning was that qualified 
privilege affords protection for certain 
. . l 85 communications on y; 
"If the occasion of the privil~ge is used 
for a different purpose such as the venting 
of spite or ill will, we can see no reason 
why it should be protected, We believe 
that the exclusion of motives of ill will 
from the meaning of malice would give a 
licence to persons to deliberately abuse 
occasions of qualified privilege." 
Expanding on this point, it can be argued that 
qualified privilege protects the right of the 
public to receive information only in certain 
circumstances. Thus under the privilege you 
cannot repeat the defamatory words as often as 
you like, Once the matter is reported the duty 
to report it is discharged. Similarly, once an 
occasion of privilege is used for an improper 
purpose the publisher is merely using the occasion 
for his or her own ends, in opposition to the 
policy behind the protection. 
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Furthermore, qualified privilege only provides 
that in some circumstances the presumption of 
malice which is taken on the publication of 
defamatory matter, is rebutted. The privilege 
transfers the onus to the plaintiff to prove 
1
. 86 
express ma ice . If therefore, publication 
was for an improper purpose the privilege cannot 
be available. 
The Faulks Committee on Defamation in its report 
had "no doubt whatever 1187that the principle that 
malice defeats the privilege should stand in its 
present form, although some of their number were 
inclined to favour the abolition of the concept 
of malice in relation to fair comment. 
(i ii) Conclusion 
It is the writer's view that the arguments 
raised for dropping the malice element in 
relation to qualified privilege have not been 
answered. Why should the circumstances in which 
qualified privilege is afforded include the 
absence of malice? If the reciprocal duty and 
interest in publication are there, why should 
the publishers motive effectively say that he 
should not publish the material? 
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I submit that the argument becomes even stronger 
once the media defence proposed by the NZ 
Committee is considered specifically. If the 
requirements of the media defence are met then 
by the very nature of those requirements the 
public should have received the published 
material. Why then make the publisher liable 
because he was actuated by his own personal 
feelings? 
In its Working Paper which preceded the Final 
Report, the NZ Committee stated, on the law 
l t . . . l 88 re a 1ng to pr1v1 ege; 
"Malice is the regulator to ensure that the 
defence does not go too far. It is directed 
as admonition to and punishment of the 
defendant. The occasion and statement 
remain proper." 
In the writer's view, such an approach is out 
of place where the Committee's media defence is 
concerned. The defence is designed to provide 
the media with a protection where they have acted 
reasonably as to the truth of the published 
facts and opinions, so that they will not hesitate 
to publish matter of public interest which they 
believe to be true on good grounds. This 
- 49 -
results in a better media service through the 
removal of the chilling effect. Surely at this 
stage the media defence should afford what the 
Australian background paper called "limited" 
rather than a "qualified" privilege - limited 
in that it is available only if certain 
circumstances exist (of which the absence of 
malice isn't one). Even if the publisher has 
deliberately abused the occasion he has "acted 
with reasonable care in all the circumstances 
and believed on reasonable grounds that the 
89 statements of fact were true" . Why should 
malice prejudice a publisher's good grounds for 
publishing the material? I submit that to 
enable proof of malice to defeat a media defence 
of reasonable care would be more trouble than 
it's worth. 
I note however, that while the media tendency to 
rely on qualified privilege draws in malice as a 
potential issue, it is the writer's view that to 
describe it as "the critical issue 1190 once 
qualified privilege is pleaded, is to state the 
position too strongly. 
OTHE R DIFFERENCES ------------
In c omparing other elements o f the two proposed 
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defences the greater extension of the NZ Committee's 
proposal in that it covers statements of opinion or 
comment seems to be a logical one, especially since 
t hose comments should be (and are, under their 
proposal) able to be supported by facts privileged by 
t he defence. If the defendant can prove that the 
fac ts were true the defence of fair comment would 
sti ll be available. The media defence is to help the 
med ia where they can only prove that all reasonable 
care was taken as to the truth of the facts. Further, 
i f the defamatory matter is purely comment, then fair 
comment is a more suitable defence. 
Th e other difference is that the Australian background 
( 
paper takes the view that "the media should establish 
truth or retract, though not necessarily pay damages 
if the statement, though false was the result of a 
genuine belief in truth formed after making reasonable 
. . ..91 . · h enquiries . Thus it proposes a change in .t e 
nature of the remedy rather than in the basis of 
liability92 . The Australian proposal is a defence 
to general damages, ie those damages other than 
damages for loss actually incurred by a plaintiff. 
Examples of actual financial loss would be where a 
p laintiff has lost his or her employment or a profitable 
contract dur to being defamed. It is rare for a ,..._ 
p laintiff to be able to prove such a claim, but where 
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it does occur it is the writer's view that the publisher 
should compensate the plaintiff, despite the 
reasonableness of publication in the circumstances. 
While in a sense this tends to leave a publisher's 
liability to chance, it is submitted that the result is 
a fair one. In these rare cases the interests of the 
plaintiff are more pressing. 
The NZ Committee proposed a 'straight' defence of 
media qualified privilege. Considering the writer's 
vi ew that malice should not be relevant to the defence 
I submit that the form of the defence proposed by the 
Australian paper should be adopted . By exclud ing the 
te rm "qualified privilege" it is clearer, and it 
answers the criticism noted earlier that the NZ 
Committee's proposal did not enable the recovery of 
. 1 d 93 specia amages. 
THE "SOURCES" PROBLEM 
The criticism has been made of both the proposed 
media defences that in practice they would only be 
useful where sources could be disclosed. This, it is 
sa id, would be necessary for a d efendant to show that 
i t has exercised all reasonable care. However the 
Australian Background Paper noted tha t the contrary 
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vi ew was put to them by the Australian Journalists 
. . 94 As soc1.at1.on; 
"We concede that this may present some 
difficulties but believe they are overstressed 
... If, as we would maintain is likely, a 
publication depended on checking a number of 
likely sources, it is quite probable that one 
such source would have gone 'on the record' by 
the time of publication. Finally, on this 
aspect, we would see it as preferable for such a 
defence to be available, even if there were 
times when it may prove to be ineffective because 
of the non-disclosure tradition." 
The NZ Committee also rejected the obstacle as being 
significant since initial sources will often not need 
, · 95 to be relied on to use the defence . In the 
wr iter's view the problem is not a large one, and if 
doubt is present as to how great an effect the 
non-disclosure tradition would have on a 'reasonable 
care' defence, then it is desirable that the media 
themselves should have their views canvassed on the 
point. 
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THE AUSTRALIAN CODE STATES 
rt i s interesting to note the position in the 
Aust ralian Code States, Queensland, Tasmania and New 
south Wales. Although the position in New South 
Wale s has now changed, the Codes gave a qualified 
. · 1 . f b . h d 
96 
statutory privi ege in respect o matter pu lis e, 
"in good faith in the course of, or for the 
purposes of, the discussion of some subject of 
public interest, the public discussion of which is 
for the public benefit ... " 
Unti l the 1960's this provision was not interpreted 
as e xtending the common law. However since a series 
of decisions culminating in that of the High Court of 
A . . 1 1 · d
97 . ust ralia in Calwel v Ipec Austra ia Lt it has 
become clear that a media defendant in those states 
may escape liability for the publication of 
defamatory, untrue statements, if it can persuade a 
cour t that the purpose of the publication was to give 
information to the public on a matter of publi c 
importance, and if the plaintiff is unable to prove 
that the defendant was actuated by ill will or other 
improper motive. This approach was rejected in the 
Aust ralian background paper because it relied on a 
qual ified privilege, defensible by mali c e
98
. 
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Similarly, it is the writer's view that the approach 
s uggested in the Australian paper is preferable. It 
i s not defeated by proof of malice and it expressly 
caters for the defendant who has a belief based upon 
r easonable enquiries that the published matter was 
t rue. 
THE PROPOSED DEFENCE 
I n conclusion, I submit that the first defence the 
media should have is a defence to general damages 
where the publisher has acted with reasonable care. 
I t would not be defeated by proof of malice, and the 
publisher must have given the person defamed an 
opportunity to publish a statement explaining and/or 
r ebutting the offending statements. This proposal is 
essentially a combination of the defence proposed by 
t he NZ Committee and that proposed in the Australian 
paper. A suggested formulation is as follows; 
( 1) Damages in defamation, other than damages for 
any loss actually incurred by a plaintiff as a 
result of the publication complained of, shall 
not be recoverable in respect of the publication 
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of any matter published in a news medium if; 
(a) The subject-matter of the publication was 
one of public interest at the time of 
publication; and 
(b) So far as the matter consists of statements 
of fact, the person by whom it was published, 
at the time of publication acted with 
reasonable care in all the circumstances 
and believed on reasonable grounds that the 
statements of fact were true; and 
(c) So far as the matter is an expression of 
opinion -
(i) The opinion was at the time of 
publication the genuine opinion of the 
person by whom it was published; and 
(ii) The opinion was at the time of 
publication capable of being supported 
by any statements of fact to which 
paragraph (b) of this subsection 
applies, either by themselves or in 
conjunction with any other facts known 
at the time of publication to the 
person to whom the publication was 
made; and 
(d) The defendant has given the person who 
claims to be defamed by the publication an 
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opportunity to have a reasonable statement 
of explanation or of rebuttal, or both 
explanation and of rebuttal, published in 
the same medium as the publication complained 
of, with adequate prominence and without 
undue delay. 
(2 ) A defence under this section shall not fail by 
reason that the defendant was actuated by spite 
or ill will towards the plaintiff or otherwise 
took improper advantage of the occasion of 
publication. 
Fur the r provisions as to the right of reply would 
fo l low those suggested by the NZ Committee, as discussed 
in Par t One of this paper. The establishment of the 
defence would be a question for the judge alone to 
dec ide . The defence would be restricted to matter 
published in a "news medium", unlike the Australian 
proposal. 
The limited privilege defence proposed in the 
Aus tra lian background paper was rejected by the 
Commis sion in its final report. As evidenced by 
Press releases of the Australian Attorney-General the 
Proposal nevertheless remained a live one. However 
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on 25 May 1984 the Standing-Committee of Attorney-
Generals agreed not to further pursue the matter of a 
general defence of limited privilege for media 
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reports . This decision it appears, can be 
att ributed to a considerable extent to the desire for 
a uniform defamation law throughout Australia, and 
the problems that entails in a Federal State. Defamation 
reform in Australia has had nationwide consistency as 
it s overriding objective and agreement between all the 
States has proved difficult to obtain. 
I t urn now to consider the second defence which in 
the writer's view it would be worthwhile for New 
Zea land to adopt. 
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PART IV 
THE ATTRIBUTED STATEMENT DEFENCE 
I submit that in addition to the defence of 'reasonable 
belie f in truth', the media should also have a second 
defence. This is the defence of the fair report of 
an attributed statement. The proposal finds its 
origins in the Australian Background Paper, and its 
adopt ion was recommended by the Australian Commission in 
, . l 100 1ts Fina Report . The defence is a n extension of 
the defence of fair report. 
The Background Paper suggested the following provision;
101 
"In any defamation action where the matter 
complained of consists of, or contains, a statement 
attributed by the defendant to another, actual 
and named, person without any adoption of the 
substance of that statement by the defendant the 
defence of fair report in respect of any 
imputation contained in the statement, shall be 
established upon proof: 
(a) that the published material was in fact a 
fair and accurate report of a statement 
actually made by the named person; 
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(b) that the material was published for the 
information of the public or the 
advancement of education: and 
(c) that the defendant afforded the plaintiff a 
full and adequate reply to the defamatory 
imputations contained in the statement." 
~e Commission questioned the appropriateness of the 
tradit ional principle, affirmed in Truth (NZ) Ltd v 
102 
Holloway , that 
"every republication of a libel is a new libel, 
and each publisher is answerable for his act to 
the same extent as if the calumny originated 
from him.
11103 
The j ustification for the principle is that "he who 
peddle s a defamatory statement imposes it on a new 
audience and should be liable for the damage thereby 
. .,104 
occas 1.oned . In questioning this principle, the 
Commission suggested for example, that it may be a 
matte r of legitimate public interest that a person is 
making allegations of dishonesty of a Minister of the 
Crown. 
The a rguments against the defence were noted, namely 
that the change would encourage the peddling of 
defamation by persons who had no knowledge as to the 
truth of the statements made, and that the media 
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would be free to report the unfounded accusations of 
persons of no repute, perhaps of no substance and 
perhaps acting maliciously. 
Against these arguments the Commission put the 
defendant's duty to accord a full and adequate right 
o f reply and the requirement that the original defamer 
be "actual and named", enabling the plaintiff to take 
h im to court. In addition they stated,lOS 
"in the case of the media we would expect some 
responsibility in repeating statements ... " 
The suggestion would also obviate the necessity of 
p roviding defences for the fair report of Parliamentary, 
j udicial or official proceedings and so simplify the 
l aw. 
THE RECOMMENDATION 
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its Final 
Report said that many submissions were against the 
106 
p roposal; for example 
"It was .said that the defence, as frame d , might 
encourage irresponsible journalists to repeat 
scurrilous statements made by irresponsib le 
persons." 
I n the weight of these submissions the question was 
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whether the proposal should be abandoned or modified 
t o diminish the feared abuse. It was said that often 
t he information or complaint will come from ordinary 
c itizens with a grievance against persons or bodies 
in positions of authority, and that to refuse 
publication may be effectively to deny any redress 
whatever. Public access to the media was seen to be 
s eriously limited at present, but increasingly 
. t 107 1.mpor ant 
The expanded defence of fair report it was decided, 
should be retained, but with the requirements of the 
defence tightened up to mininise potential abuse. 
There was "widespread" acceptance of the view that 
t he statutory fair and accurate report lists "were 
108 
t oo rigid and should be relaxed" . 
The relevant provisions of the final formulation are 
a s follows; 
DEFENCE OF FAIR REPORT 
( 1) It is a defence to a defamation action that the 
defamatory matter was published by the defendant 
without any adoption by him of the substance of 
the matter and -
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the defamatory matter was contained in an 
attributed statement by a person other than 
the defendant or a servant or agent of the 
defendant, its publication by the defendant, 
having regard to its nature and the 
circumstances surrounding its making, was 
reasonable, and the defendant, his servants 
or agents, did not influence in any way the 
substance of the attributed statement. 
( 2) The defence under sub-section (1) in respect of 
a publication to which the plaintiff has a right 
of reply under sub-section (3) fails where -
(a) the plaintiff proves that he requested the 
defendant to publish or cause to be published 
a reply by the plaintiff to the defamatory 
matter; and 
(b) the defendant does not prove that he published 
or caused to be published the reply at the 
earliest opportunity reasonably available 
after the request of the plaintiff an? in 
such form and manner as would be likely to 
reach the same general audience as the 
report or attributed statement reached. 
( 3) A plaintiff has a right of reply to any report 
or attributed statement referred to in sub-section 
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(1) except a report or attributed statement -
(a) in relation to which the d efendant has 
already published a reply by the plaintiff; 
or 
(b) relating to the proceedings of a court. 
(4 ) In determining what is the earliest opportunity 
reasonably available for the purposes of this 
section, regard shall be had to the nature, 
form, extent and manner of the publication of 
the report or the attributed statement and to 
the damage that the plaintiff is likely to 
suffer by reason of any delay on the part of the 
defendant. 
(5) In this section, "attributed statement" means a 
statement or comment by a person identified by 
name on a topic of public interest that was 
fairly, accurately and reasonably contemporaneously 
reported or reproduced in any form, or was broadcast 
or televised. 
The defence is not confined to use by the news media, 
though this may be a necessary restrictio n given the 
requirements under section 2(b). 
The first thing to note is that the sta tement must_ be 
an attributed statement. A publishe r c anno t use the 
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defence to publish his own allegations, and the 
allegations must relate to a 'topic of public 
interest' - as opposed to some purely private or 
personal matter. The publisher therefore, does not 
have to speculate whether it was in the public 
interest to publish the allegations. To assist 
publ ishers further it was proposed to include a 
• 1 d f O • t • f I • f bl • • I 109 part ia e ini ion o a topic o- pu ic interest . 
The statement must also be reported "fairly, 
accurately and reasonably contemporaneously" (a 
matter of degree). Most importantly, the author of 
the original statement must be named, a requirement 
which serves two purposes. It limits abuse by ensuring 
that the source of the information actually exists 
and it enables the plaintiff to have an avenue for 
redress. If the plaintiff wants damages the original 
defamer must be his source, but irrespective of the 
feasibility of an action there, he will obtain a 
declaration and correction order at the very least. 
Publication in the circumstances, must be reasonable, 
This 'screen' was, the Report said, necessarily 
indeterminate in form, "the circumstances in which 
statements are made are so variable that some safeguards 
m t b 
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us e introduced . In addition, the publisher 
must not influence the substance of the statement -
the publisher must not adopt the report and make the 
charge his own. 
- 65 -
Finally, there is the normal provision for a right 
of reply. This includes a discretion given to the 
court where an action is taken against the original 
de famer, to order the reporter to publish
111 
"a fair and accurate report of the result of the 
defamation action with the same prominence as 
the publication of the report of the attributed 
statement." 
DI SCUSSION 
I said earlier in this paper that the e d itor of 
Ga tley saw this fair report defence as worthwhile
112 
The question which must be asked, is whether the 
de fence is still open to abuse? 
The answer to this question would appear to be no. 
The defence does not leave the media "free to report 
the unfounded accusations of persons of no repute, 
perhaps of no substance and perhaps acting 
1
. . ., 113 
ma 1c1ously . Under the proposed defence, such 
publication would not be reasonable, Furthermore, I 
do not foresee the courts as having d ifficulty in 
applying the test. They are used to applying the test 
of 'the reasonable man in a particular profession'. 
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(i) The Republication Rule 
However, a problem could be that by reporting an 
attributed statement the media amplifies its 
audience to a large section of the population. 
Th · · t · h ( ) 114 is poin arose in Trut NZ Ltd v Holloway . 
The case concerned an interview published in an 
article in which one Judd recounted his own 
conversation with a person desiring an import 
licence. In the conversation Judd said "See 
Phil" ( the plaintiff Minister) "and Phil would 
fix it". The plaintiff alleged an innuendo that 
he was a person prepared to act dishonestly in 
connection with the issue of import licences, 
and recovered damages. The defendant newspaper 
therefore, had published an attributed statement. 
Lord Denning however wrote on the principle of 
bl . 
. 115 repu 1cat1on, 
"if the words had not been repeated by the 
newspaper, the damage done by Judd would be 
as nothing compared to the damage done by 
the newspaper when it repeated it. It 
broadcast the statement to the people at 
large, and it made it worse by making it 
one of the grounds on which it called for 
an inquiry, for thereby it suggested that 
some credence was to be given to it." 
... 
Lord Denning saw the case as a good instance of 
the justice of the republication rule. However, 
if Mr Judd is being interviewed by a newspaper 
he knows that the statement is going to be 
broadcast to the people at large. Why then, 
shouldn't he be the one liable? Here, it would 
appear, the defence would fail, because in 
calling for an inquiry into the matter the 
newspaper adopted the allegations as its own. 
( ii) Further Issues 
On the other hand, an action against the original 
defamer in such circumstances is likely to result 
in a high award of damages due to wide publication. 
The financial position of the defendant may not 
be able to meet the award. The newspaper will 
usually have better financial resources and can 
insure against claims, even though research by 
the NZ Committee pointed to a drop in the number 
. . . . . 116 
of newspapers which carry liability insurance 
Another worry is the proposed right of reply. 
The defence fails if the plaintiff proves that 
he requested the defendant to publish a right of 
reply and the defendant does not prove that he 
published the reply at the earliest opportunity 
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available. Will the media receive an unacceptable 
level of demand for a right of reply? Also a 
reply may sometimes need to go into considerable 
detail to adequately answer the allegations. A 
reply which appears to the public to be published 
solely for legal safety is little use to a 
defendant. Will the request for a right of reply 
be used by people in the same way that "gagging 
writs" are used, namely where the person making 
the request has no intention of bringing an 
action? It is also possible that a defendant 
might truthfully allege that his comments were 
never intended for general media use (unlike for 
117 
example, Jones v Templeton where the defendant 
distributed the defamatory matter to the 
parliamentary press gallery). 
Some suggestions put forward by Senator Gareth 
Evans in Australia to counter the right of reply 
problem were -
that the reply must concern itself with 
factual matter only 
that it must strictly relate to the alleged 
defamatory imputation 
that it must not itself be defamatory or 
. 1 f 1 118 otherwise un aw u . 
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In addition there is a suggestion which the 
Committee in New Zealand also made, that the 
reply be given 'adequate' rather than 'the same' 
prominence, keeping in mind the reasonable 
. f h . 119 interests o t e publisher . 
CONCLUSION ON THE DEFENCE 
The proposed defence protects the media in a situation 
dif ferent to that covered by the "reasonable belief in 
tru th" defence. Where the defamatory matter comes from 
an attributed source, it is submitted that the media 
should not be required to have exercised reasonable 
care as to the truth of those statements. They must 
however, exercise reasonable care in republishing the 
statements considering all the circumstances in which 
they were given. The attributed statement defence 
protects the media where the allegations are not their 
own . However both defences may be available where the 
med ia defendant has taken reasonable care and believed 
on reasonable grounds that the allegations contained 
within an attributed statement were true. 
In the writer's view the main problem with the defence 
is the damages point. The provisions for a right of 
reply can counter many of the fears raised, by 
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requiring for example that the statement of reply must 
be reasonable, as recommended by the NZ Committee's 
med ia defence. The media publisher can judge for 
himself the worthiness of any request for a right of 
reply. 
As to damages, I submit that the possibility of a 
de fendant being unable to meet an award should not 
oppose the enacting of the defence. In practice, it 
wi ll be a factor the potential plaintiff will take 
into account prior to initiating a suit. While the 
wider publication may enlarge the problem from its 
present proportions, at the same time the automatic 
publication of a reply will operate to reduce the 
amount of damages awarded. 
I submit therefore, that the fair report of an 
attributed statement should be protected. Some 
research as to its potential use could prove 
interesting. In Australia for example, during the 
years 1966 to 1977 inclusive, Western Australia 
Newspapers Ltd, the publishers of two Perth dailies, 
received 45 complaints or actions. Of these, 24 arose 
out of material furnished by an attributed source, 
. h 120 
and 16 out or material originated by the publ1s er · 
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PART V 
FINAL CONCLUSION 
Before the end of this year there should be a 
defamation bill introduced to Parliament, and if the 
experience of Australia is any indication to go by, it 
should provoke an interesting debate. It appears 
likely that the media qualified privilege defence 
proposed by the NZ Committee will be included in the 
bil l, If that proposal is included, then the position 
of the media in the law of defamation should become 
one of the more contentious issues in the ensuing 
debate. It is in this context that this paper operates. 
I have made the submission that there should be two 
new statutory defences to a defamation action and not 
simply one. The first of these is a defence to 
general damages where the media defendant has acted 
with reasonable care in all the circumstances, and 
has given the person defamed a right of reply. This 
defence is not defeasible by malice. The second 
defence submitted affords protection to the media 
defendant who has published a fair report of a statement 
mad e by another, which is clearly attributed to that 
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person in the publication. This defence also is 
conditional on a right of reply. 
Placing these submissions in the wider context, they 
clearly involve a shift in the balance which the law 
of defamation serves to attain. That shift is an 
appreciable one to a position more favourable to the 
med ia. Throughout th©s paper the writer has been 
concerned with justifying such a move, having regard 
to the interests of the publisher, the individual 
de famed and the general public. 
As to the defences themselves, it should be remembered 
that the precise scope of the protection they afford 
could only be seen through the application of their 
provisions in the courts. Both defences involve an 
el ement of "reasonableness" which the courts would 
have to interpret with respect to the particular 
fac ts before them. 
Finally, I note that the news media are both a public 
service and a business. They have a duty to publish 
much of the information on which public debate is 
dependant, yet at the same time they are trying to 
increase circulation and profitability. Depending on 
whether the individual views the media as primarily a 
public service or primarily a business, they will 
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come out either in favour of f r eedom of expression or 
fre edom from defamation in decid ing where the balance 
of interest should lie
121
. It is the writer's view 
that the media deserve greater protection. 
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